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Body representation refers to perception, memory, and cognition related to the body
and is updated continuously by sensory input. The present study examined the influence
of goals on body representation updating with two experiments of the rubber hand
paradigm. In the experiments, participants moved their hidden left hands forward and
backward either in response to instruction to touch a virtual object or without any specific
goal, while a virtual left hand was presented 250 mm above the real hand and moved
in synchrony with the real hand. Participants then provided information concerning the
perceived heights of their real left hands and rated their sense of agency and ownership
of the virtual hand. Results of Experiment 1 showed that when participants moved their
hands with the goal of touching a virtual object and received feedback indicating goal
attainment, the perceived positions of their real hands shifted more toward that of the
virtual hand relative to that in the condition without a goal, indicating that their body
representations underwent greater modification. Furthermore, results of Experiment 2
showed that the effect of goal-directed movement occurred in the active condition, in
which participants moved their own hands, but did not occur in the passive condition,
in which participants’ hands were moved by the experimenter. Therefore, we concluded
that the sense of agency probably contributed to the updating of body representation
involving goal-directed movement.
Keywords: rubber hand illusion, body representation, sense of agency, sense of ownership, proprioceptive drift,
goal, intention
INTRODUCTION
People’s perceptions of their own bodies constitute a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness
and have been discussed by numerous researchers in multiple fields such as psychology,
neuroscience, and engineering. Mental representation of the body involves both percepts
and abstract knowledge, and beliefs and cognition about the body. Two concepts are usually
used to describe body representation: body image and body schema (Gallagher, 1986; Paillard,
1999; de Vignemont, 2010). Usually, body image refers to perceptual, cognitive, or emotional
awareness of the body, while body schema is more holistic and operates in a non-conscious
manner, for example, containing certain habitual postures and movements (Gallagher, 1986).
However, the definition and usage of these concepts is often unclear and confusing. Further, a
prior study clarified body representation as belonging to two classes: perceptual representation
(what the body is felt to be like), and cognitive representation (what the body is believed to
be like; Longo et al., 2010). According to Longo et al. (2010), perceptual body representation
involves online updating of the mental body, including superficial percepts and percepts
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of body size, shape, and posture, and influences our perception
of external objects and behaviors. In contrast, cognitive body
representation refers to the cognition of the body as a physical
object in the external world (Longo et al., 2010), and is considered
to be constructed and updated at the cognitive level. For example,
in phantom limb pain, patients who have lost a limb by accident
or amputation still have vivid percepts of the missing limb
but know that it does not exist. In this case, the perceptual
body representation in the brain has not been updated, but
the cognitive representation has been updated (Longo et al.,
2010). In the present study, we focused on the online updating
of perceptual body representations in Longo et al.’s (2010)
definition.
The underlying process of online body representation
updating can be examined using the rubber hand illusion.
In the original rubber hand illusion, after a fake rubber hand
is brushed synchronously with the individual’s hidden real
hand for a certain period, the individual feels the touch of
the viewed brush, as if the rubber hand had sensed the
touch (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Further, in the rubber
hand illusion, individuals also experience the rubber hand as
belonging to themselves (i.e., sense of ownership), and show
a distorted sense of position of their real hands drifting to
the rubber hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The rubber
hand illusion reflects an interaction between vision, touch, and
proprioception (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). When the tactile
input from the real hand matches visual information for the
rubber hand, a sense of ownership of the real hand is extended
to the rubber hand, and the incorrect position of the fake
hand is integrated into the individual’s body representation and
influences proprioception. Proprioceptive drift has been used
widely as a behavioral indicator of body representation updating
in the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris
and Haggard, 2005a; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Costantini and
Haggard, 2007; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). In addition, the
extension of body ownership in the rubber hand illusion has
been examined not only via subjective rating of ownership
(Shimada et al., 2009; Guterstam et al., 2011; Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012, 2014) but also via objective measures such as
skin conductance responses (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003;
Ehrsson et al., 2008) and muscle activity (Perez-Marcos et al.,
2009; Slater et al., 2009; Moretto et al., 2011). Although previous
studies suggested common mechanisms for proprioceptive
drift and the illusory sense of ownership (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014), recent
findings reported a distinction between them, suggesting that
different multisensory mechanisms underlie the two phenomena
(Kammers et al., 2009; Rohde et al., 2011; Blanke, 2012).
Blanke (2012) suggested that body consciousness involves three
aspects: self-identification (i.e., body ownership), self-location
(where ‘‘I’’ am in space), and first-person perspective (the
experience of the position from where ‘‘I’’ perceive the world),
and that these aspects are probably based on distinct brain
mechanisms.
Tsakiris and Haggard (2005b) examined the role of
body schema on the rubber hand illusion, and found that
proprioceptive drift occurred only when the rubber hand’s
posture was similar in appearance to that of the real hand.
The results indicated that the bottom-up integration of
multiple sensory input is necessary, but not sufficient for
body representation updating, and the illusion is modulated by
top-down influences originating from one’s body representation
(Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005b). Moreover, a recent study using
immersive virtual reality demonstrated that the illusion of
ownership could be generated from the realistic appearance
of a fake (virtual) body and first-person perspective, even
without any other congruent visuotactile or sensorimotor
cues (Maselli and Slater, 2013), revealing the strong influence
of body schema and first-person perspective in the illusion.
Recent research using visuo-motor adaptation showed that
synchronous movements can also produce the rubber hand
illusion (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014).
In such paradigms, both the sense of ownership (i.e., the feeling
that the fake hand belongs to oneself; Gallagher, 2000) and the
sense of agency (i.e., the feeling that the movements of the fake
hand are generated by oneself; Gallagher, 2000) are generated
for the rubber hand. In Tsakiris et al.’s (2006) experiment,
the participants watched a projection of their own hands on a
screen and moved their index or little fingers. When the finger
movements were generated by external forces, proprioceptive
drift occurred only for the moving finger; in contrast, when
participants moved their fingers themselves, proprioceptive
drift also occurred for unmoving fingers, indicating that motor
agency integrated distinct body parts into a coherent and
unified whole (Tsakiris et al., 2006). Moreover, Tsakiris et al.
(2007) pointed out that although afferent signals alone could
generate sense of ownership and modify body representation,
a more coherent experience of the body depends on the
integration of both effect and afferent signals in an action
context.
In the present study, we aimed to examine the influence
of goal-related instruction and goal-attainment feedback on
body representation updating, using the visuo-motor adapted
version of the rubber hand paradigm. Goal-directed movements
are very common in daily life. Prior studies have reported
that goals and goal-attainment feedback greatly influenced
sense of agency during action (Aarts et al., 2005; Metcalfe
and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2013; van der Weiden
et al., 2013; Wen et al., 2015b,c). Sense of agency could play
an important role in integrating body representation during
body movement (Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2007). In the present
study, we hypothesized that goal-directed movements may
improve body representation updating, and sense of agency
may play a role in this process. This issue is important in
understanding the processes underlying body representation
and helps to clarify the internal relationship between different
factors underlying self-consciousness including sense of agency,
ownership, and body representation. In the present study,
we first clarified the effect of goal-directed movement on
body representation updating in Experiment 1 by examining
whether proprioceptive drift differed between conditions with
and without a specific goal or goal-attainment feedback.
Thereafter, we further examined the role of sense of agency
in Experiment 2, in which we compared the effect of
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The present study used the rubber hand paradigm with virtual
reality stimuli. The participant moved his or her hidden
left hand forward and backward, while a virtual left hand
was presented 250 mm above the real hand and moved in
synchrony with it. Participants were instructed to move their
hands according to cued timing (without a specific goal) or
an instruction to touch a moving object (with a specific goal).
We examined the effects of having a goal and goal-attainment
feedback on proprioceptive drift. The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the School of Engineering at the University
of Tokyo, and written informed consent was obtained from all
participants prior to participation.
Participants
Twenty students with normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity participated in the experiment (three women, mean
age = 22.8 years, SD = 2.0, range 20–25 years). The sample
size was chosen because it provided power of 0.95 in revealing
the difference between the conditions with and without a goal,
based on the results for the first five samples (a priori power was
computed using G∗Power 3, Faul et al., 2007).
Stimuli and Tasks
A virtual left hand was presented on the left side of a
597 × 336 mm (width × height) blue screen using OpenGL
(an application programing interface for rendering graphics,
Figures 1A,B). The size of the virtual hand was 105 × 145 mm
(width × height), similar to the average size of a normal hand.
The virtual hand moved between the bottom and center of the
screen, in synchrony with the participant’s hand, and an arm
was presented when the virtual hand moved to the center of the
screen, giving the appearance of the virtual hand being stretched
out from the bottom of the screen. Two horizontal lines were
represented at the bottom and center of the screen, 149 mm
apart. The color of the two lines alternated between red and
white at random intervals of 4–6 s in the conditions without
goals. Participants placed their hands on a sliding rail to restrict
hand movements in a horizontal direction (Figure 1C). The
distance between the sliding rail and the surface of the screen
was 250 mm. A 3-D position sensor (PHANToM premium 1.5,
Sensable Inc.) was attached to the participant’s index finger
to measure hand position. The average delay in response in
synchronous conditions was below 30 ms and was unperceivable
for participants.
In each trial, participants placed their left hand on the sliding
rail and moved it forward and backward according to the stimuli
on the screen. They were instructed to move the hand forward
until the root of the index finger reached the upper line on
the screen (e.g., Figure 1B) and backward until the root of the
thumb reached the lower line on the screen (e.g., Figure 1A).
Participants were told that they were not strictly required tomove
the distance indicated, as it was for use as a reference, and they
should move the hand while maintaining a comfortable posture.
Participants were also told to keep the hand at the initial position
(Figure 1A) between movements.
There were five conditions between trials (Table 1). In the
random condition, participants moved the left hand upon the
same instruction in the no-goal and delay conditions; however,
the virtual hand moved forward and backward at random times
without responding to the position of the participant’s hand
(the number of times the virtual hand moved was equal to the
number of cues). In the random condition, the rubber hand
illusion was not considered to have occurred and responses
served as a baseline for other conditions. In the no-goal and
delay conditions, participants were told to move the left hand
forward and backward when the lines changed color (every
4–6 s). They were told to complete this movement within
approximately 1.5 s. After the movement, they rested the left
hand on the rail to wait for the next cue. In the no-goal condition,
the movement of the virtual hand responded to the position of
the real hand immediately. In the delay condition, the virtual
hand responded to the position of the real hand after a 1000 ms
delay. We used the delay condition to manipulate agency on
an intermediate level (Farrer et al., 2013; Wen et al., 2015a) to
examine the hypothesis that agency could contribute to body
representation updating.
In the goal-without-feedback and goal-with-feedback
conditions, the two lines on the screen remained white in
FIGURE 1 | Example of the screen that presented a virtual hand and flying object in the conditions with the goal involving touching an object
(A), example of the screen showing the virtual hand touching the flying object (B) and arrangement of the experimental devices (C).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 329
Wen et al. Goals Enhance Body Representation Updating
TABLE 1 | List of conditions in the experimental task.
Synchronized Goal involving Goal-attainment
stimuli touching feedback
an object
Random No No –
Delay 1000 ms delay No –
No goal Yes No –
Goal without feedback Yes Yes No
Goal with feedback Yes Yes Yes
color, and a red block emerged from the left of the screen
and along the upper line at a speed of 100 mm/s, every
4–6 s. The participant was instructed to move his or her
hand forward to touch the flying object with the virtual
hand. The task was easy to achieve, and all participants
were able to touch the flying object once they had practiced.
For participants in the goal-without-feedback condition,
the object continued to fly, even after being touched, but
disappeared when it passed the center of the screen. In the
goal-with-feedback condition, the object stopped after being
touched and disappeared 1 s later. The object disappeared
after passing the center of the screen if participants did
not touch it. The five conditions are listed in Table 1. The
number of cues (color changing of the lines, flying object)
in each trial of each condition was equal (36 in each trial);
therefore, the number of hand movements in each trial
should have been the same when participants followed the
instruction.
In each trial, participants performed hand movements for
3 min. Previous studies observed proprioceptive drift after
a visuo-motor adaption for 1.5–3 min (Tsakiris et al., 2006;
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012); therefore, we believe 3 min should
be enough to observe the rubber hand illusion. Thereafter,
participants pointed to the perceived height of the left hand
on a ruler, which was placed to their right, using the right
index finger with their eyes closed. We did not measure pre-
or post-drift for each trial. Instead, proprioceptive drift in
the random condition served as a baseline, and responses
in other conditions were compared with the baseline. After
the 3 min hand movement, participants verbally rated two
statements that referred to the feeling of ownership (‘‘I felt as
if the virtual hand was my hand’’) and agency (‘‘the virtual
hand moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying
my will’’) on a 7-point Likert scale (−3: totally disagree; 0:
uncertain; +3: totally agree). The two statements were modified
from those used in prior studies examining the rubber hand
illusion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Kalckert and Ehrsson,
2012).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room, seated in
front of a 27′′ LCDmonitor. The height of the chair was adjusted
to ensure that participants’ eyes were approximately 350 mm
above the surface of the monitor. Participants’ arms and the
bottom of themonitor were covered with a blanket, to ensure that
participants could not see the movement of their own arms. Prior
to each trial, the initial position of the participant’s left hand was
adjusted to ensure that the virtual hand appeared above the real
hand. Each condition comprised three blocked trials, resulting
in a total of 15 trials. Prior to each condition, participants
received an explanation regarding the task and practiced the
movement for 1 min. After each trial, participants detached the
3-D position sensor from the finger, exposed the hand, and took
a 3 min break. The order of conditions was randomized between




Average proprioceptive drift (difference from actual height) and
standard errors for each condition are shown in Figure 2. We
conducted a repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA)
to examine the influence of condition on proprioceptive drift.
The main effect of condition was significant (F(4,76) = 23.58,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.55; random:M = 68.18 mm, SD = 43.46 mm;
delay:M = 79.77 mm, SD= 50.82 mm; no-goal:M = 95.92 mm,
SD = 46.80 mm; goal-without-feedback: M = 100.03 mm,
SD = 45.82 mm; goal-with-feedback: M = 111.13 mm,
SD = 50.51 mm). For post hoc comparisons between conditions,
the significance level was set at 0.005 according to the
Bonferroni correction. Proprioceptive drift in the no-goal,
goal-without-feedback, and goal-with-feedback conditions
differed significantly from those in the random and delay
conditions (random and no-goal conditions, t(19) = −4.70,
p < 0.001; random and goal-without-feedback conditions,
t(19) = −5.78, p < 0.001; random and goal-with-feedback
conditions, t(19) = −6.49, p < 0.001; delay and no-goal
conditions, t(19) = −4.34, p < 0.001; delay and goal-without-
feedback conditions, t(19) = −5.33, p < 0.001; delay and
goal-with-feedback, t(19) =−6.82, p< 0.001). More importantly,
the proprioceptive drift in the goal-with-feedback condition
FIGURE 2 | Mean proprioceptive drift in each condition in
Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. Proprioceptive drift in the
goal-with-feedback condition differed significantly from that of the no-goal
condition, but the difference between the goal-without-feedback and no-goal
conditions was nonsignificant.
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was significantly larger relative to that observed in the no-goal
condition (t(19) = 3.91, p = 0.001) but did not differ from that
observed in the goal-without-feedback condition (t(19) = 2.82,
p = 0.011). The difference between the no-goal and goal-
without-feedback conditions was nonsignificant (t(19) = −1.02,
p= 0.320).
Ownership and Agency Ratings
The means and standard errors for ownership and agency
ratings for the virtual hand are presented in Figure 3.
With respect to the sense of ownership rating, the repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition
(F(4,76) = 53.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.74; random: M = −1.97,
SD = 1.07; delay: M = −1.10, SD = 1.68; no-goal: M = 1.42,
SD = 1.60; goal-without-feedback: M = 1.10, SD = 1.50;
goal-with-feedback: M = 1.32, SD = 1.46). A significance
level of 0.005 was used for post hoc multiple comparisons
according to the Bonferroni correction. Ratings in the no-goal,
goal-without-feedback, and goal-with-feedback conditions were
significantly higher relative to those observed in the random
and delayed conditions (random and no-goal conditions,
t(19) = −9.77, p < 0.001; random and goal-without-feedback
conditions, t(19) = −9.39, p < 0.001; random and goal-
with-feedback conditions, t(19) = −10.14, p < 0.001; delay
and no-goal conditions, t(19) = −7.52, p < 0.001; delay and
goal-without-feedback conditions, t(19) = −6.26, p < 0.001;
delay and goal-with-feedback, t(19) = −7.21, p < 0.001).
The differences between the random and delay conditions,
and the differences between no-goal, goal-without-feedback,
and goal-with-feedback conditions were nonsignificant (random
and delay: t(19) = −2.01, p = 0.059; no-goal and goal-
without-feedback conditions: t(19) = 2.65, p = 0.016; no-goal
and goal-with-feedback conditions: t(19) = 0.69, p = 0.500;
and goal-without-feedback and goal-with-feedback conditions:
t(19) =−1.66, p= 0.114).
With respect to sense of agency ratings, the main effect
of condition was significant (F(4,76) = 114.39, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.86; random: M = −2.27, SD = 0.99; delay: M = −0.15,
SD = 1.73; no-goal: M = 2.62, SD = 0.62; goal-without-
feedback: M = 2.33, SD = 1.16; goal-with-feedback: M = 2.40,
SD = 0.96). A significance level of 0.005 was used for post hoc
multiple comparisons according to the Bonferroni correction.
The rating in the random condition was significantly lower
relative to those observed in the other conditions (random and
delay conditions, t(19) = −4.47, p < 0.001; random and
no-goal conditions, t(19) = −20.80, p < 0.001; random and
goal-without-feedback, t(19) = −15.20, p < 0.001; random
and goal-with-feedback, t(19) = −17.62, p < 0.001). The
rating in the delay condition was significantly lower relative
to those observed in the no-goal, goal-without-feedback, and
goal-with-feedback conditions (delay and no-goal conditions,
t(19)=−8.43, p< 0.001; delay and goal-without-feedback, t(19)=
−7.94, p < 0.001; delay and goal-with-feedback conditions,
t(19) = −8.78, p < 0.001). However, the differences between
the no-goal, goal-without-feedback, and goal-with-feedback
conditions were all nonsignificant (no-goal and goal-without-
feedback conditions: t(19) = 1.69, p = 0.108; no-goal and
goal-with-feedback conditions: t(19) = 1.49, p = 0.153;
FIGURE 3 | Mean ratings for sense of ownership and agency in each condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. Sense of ownership
ratings in the conditions with synchronous movement of the virtual hand were significantly higher relative to those observed in the conditions in which movement of
the virtual hand was delayed or completely random. The sense of agency rating in the delayed condition was significantly higher relative to that observed in the
random condition, and the ratings in the conditions with synchronous movement of the virtual hand were significantly higher relative to those observed in the delayed
and random conditions.
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and goal-without-feedback and goal-with-feedback conditions:
t(19) =−0.456, p= 0.654).
Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the influence
of goals and goal-attainment feedback on body representation
updating, using the rubber hand paradigm with virtual reality
stimuli. We found that when the participants moved their hands
according to the instruction to touch a virtual object and received
goal-attainment feedback, proprioceptive drift was larger relative
to that observed when they moved without a specific goal
and merely followed cued timings, indicating that goal-
directed movement significantly enhanced body representation
updating. In addition, when goal-attainment feedback was not
provided, the instruction to touch a virtual object did not
affect proprioceptive drift, indicating that congruence between
goal and feedback was important in body representation
updating.
The present study provided the first evidence indicating
that goal-directed movement led to greater enhancement of
body representation updating relative to that observed for
movement without a specific goal. In the no-goal condition,
the participants showed larger proprioceptive drifts relative
to those in the random condition, indicating that changes in
body representation occurred within a short period during
the experimental task. Moreover, in the goal-with-feedback
condition, proprioceptive drifts were significantly larger than
those in the no-goal condition. When there was a specific goal,
the expectation of goal achievement was probably generated
on a high cognitive level, and when it was congruent with the
goal-attainment feedback, this enhanced body representation
updating, into which incorrect visual information was integrated
to a greater extent.
Why would congruence between goals and goal-attainment
feedback enhance interactions between motor control, vision,
and proprioception in the rubber hand illusion? It is possible that
sense of agency played an important role in this phenomenon.
Prior research has shown that congruence between goals
and goal-attainment feedback, besides that between motor
commands and sensory feedback, exerted a strong influence
on sense of agency (Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe
et al., 2013; Wen et al., 2015b,c). Further, Tsakiris et al.
(2006) found that sense of agency was important in integrating
distinct body parts into coherent and unified bodily awareness.
In addition, recent studies have shown that intention of
action (without actual movement) can also produce a weaker
form of the rubber hand illusion with a brain-computer-
interface (Perez-Marcos et al., 2009; Slater et al., 2009),
revealing the potential role of agency in construction of body
representation. Therefore, goals and goal-attainment feedback
probably enhanced body representation updating via sense of
agency in our experiment. We tested this hypothesis further in
Experiment 2, comparing the effects of goal-directed movement
between the active and passive conditions. Prior research has
shown that intention regarding action plays a critical role
in sense of agency, and people experience a strong sense of
agency only during active movement (Tsakiris et al., 2006;
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012). If sense of agency plays an
important role in the effects of goal-directed movement on
body representation updating during active movement, this





In total, 17 students with normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity participated in the experiment (four women,
mean age = 25.8 years, SD = 3.7, range 20–33 years). The
participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment
and were different from the participants in Experiment 1.
Results for one participant were excluded from the analysis
because the 3-D position sensor was moved by mistake and
resulted in inconsistent positioning for the real and virtual
hands. A priori power analysis using G∗Power 3 (Faul et al.,
2007) based on the results of proprioceptive drifts in the
no-goal and goal-with-feedback conditions in Experiment 1
showed that a sample size of 16 provided power of 0.95 in
revealing the difference between the conditions with/without a
goal.
Stimuli, Task, and Procedure
The experimental paradigm used in Experiment 1 was also
used in Experiment 2. Participants moved their hands forward
and backward on a sliding rail, which was placed under a
table, while watching a virtual hand moving synchronously
on a horizontally placed monitor (Figure 1). In contrast to
Experiment 1, participants moved their hands actively (active
condition) or passively (passive condition), with the goal of
touching a virtual object (goal-directed condition) or in response
to the colors of lines on the monitor (no-goal condition).
The goal-directed and no-goal conditions in Experiment 2
were the same as the goal-with-feedback and no-goal conditions,
respectively, in Experiment 1. In the active condition,
participants were instructed to move their hands actively
(as in Experiment 1). In the passive condition, participants
were told to place their relaxed left hands on the sliding rail.
The experimenter moved the part of the sliding rail on which
the participant’s hand was placed, using two ropes connected to
the front and back. Participants were instructed to control their
hand movements, even when they knew their hands would be
moved. Each participant completed 12 trials, three for each goal
condition (goal directed vs. no goal) and mode of movement
(active vs. passive). The order of the goal conditions was
randomized between participants. The mode of movement was
blocked and the order counterbalanced between participants.
Short breaks, during which participants released their hands
from the device and exposed them to vision, were taken between
trials. The experiment lasted approximately 60 min on average.
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Results
Proprioceptive Drift
Average proprioceptive drift (difference from actual height) and
standard errors for each condition are shown in Figure 4.
A 2 (movement: active or passive) × 2 (goal condition: goal
directed or no goal) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a
significant interaction between mode of movement and goal
(F(1,15) = 4.78, p = 0.045, η2p = 0.24; no-goal active:
M = 61.29 mm, SD = 45.14 mm; goal-directed active:
M= 71.02mm, SD= 47.05mm; no-goal passive:M= 56.14mm,
SD = 41.99 mm; goal-directed passive: M = 59.70 mm,
SD = 41.97 mm). The main effects of goal condition and mode
of movement were nonsignificant (F(1,15) = 4.51, p = 0.051,
η2p = 0.23 and F(1,15) = 3.31, p = 0.089, η2p = 0.18,
respectively). Because our interest was the effect of goal in both
the active and passive conditions, we conducted comparisons
between the goal directed and no goal conditions in the two
movement conditions. The proprioceptive drift in the goal-
directed condition was greater relative to that observed in the
no-goal condition only when participants moved their hands
themselves (active condition, t(15) = 2.51, p = 0.024). The goal
conditions did not differ significantly when participants’ hands
were moved by the experimenter (passive condition, t(15) = 1.22,
p= 0.240).
Ownership and Agency Ratings
The means and standard errors for ownership and agency
ratings for the virtual hand are presented in Figure 5. With
respect to the sense of ownership rating, ANOVA results showed
that the main effects of mode of movement and goal and the
interaction between them were nonsignificant (F(1,15) = 2.63,
p = 0.126, η2p = 0.15; F(1,15) = 2.88, p = 0.110, η2p = 0.16;
and F(1,15) = 3.74, p = 0.072, η2p = 0.20, respectively; no-goal
active: M = 0.85; SD = 1.92; goal-directed active: M = 1.19;
SD = 1.66; no-goal passive: M = 0.49; SD = 1.72; goal-
directed passive: M = 0.48; SD = 1.63). With respect to the
sense of agency rating, the main effect of mode of movement
FIGURE 4 | Mean proprioceptive drift in each condition in
Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. Proprioceptive drift in the
goal-directed active condition differed significantly from that of the no-goal
active condition.
was significant (F(1,15) = 62.26, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.81),
showing that the manipulation of agency was successful. The
main effect of goal condition and the interaction between
mode of movement and goal condition were nonsignificant
(F(1,15) = 1.09, p= 0.314, η2p = 0.07 and F(1,15) = 1.72, p= 0.209,
η2p = 0.10, respectively; no-goal active: M = 2.60; SD = 0.65;
goal-directed active: M = 2.59; SD = 0.63; no-goal passive:
M = −0.99; SD = 1.70; goal-directed passive: M = −0.76;
SD= 1.71).
Discussion
In this experiment, we compared the effect of having a goal
on proprioceptive drift in active and passive movement. In
the active condition, the participants reported a strong sense
of agency regarding the movement of the virtual hand, and
proprioceptive drift in the goal-directed condition was greater
relative to that observed in the no-goal condition. In contrast,
in the passive condition, the participants reported a poor sense
of agency regarding the virtual hand, and the effect of having a
goal on proprioceptive drift was no longer present. Therefore, we
concluded that sense of agency probably played an important role
in the effect of goal-directed movement on body representation
updating, as we hypothesized in the Discussion section for
Experiment 1.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined the influence of having a goal
and goal-attainment feedback on proprioceptive drift, as an index
of body representation updating in the rubber hand illusion.
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the proprioceptive drift
observed when participants intentionally moved their hands to
achieve a specific goal and received goal-attainment feedback
was significantly greater relative that observed when they moved
their hands according to cued timing without any specific goal.
In addition, the intention to achieve a goal did not affect
proprioception without goal-attainment feedback, indicating
that the comparison of goal-achievement intention and goal-
attainment feedback is critical. Furthermore, to examine our
hypothesis that the sense of agency would play an important
role in this phenomenon, we compared the effect of having
a goal on proprioceptive drift between the active and passive
conditions in Experiment 2. The results clearly supported our
hypothesis, showing that having a goal enhanced proprioceptive
drift only in the active condition, in which participants reported
a strong sense of agency regarding the virtual hand, but it had
no effect in the passive condition, in which the participants
did not experience a sense of agency (or felt a very weak sense
of agency).
This study was the first to report that having a goal enhanced
body representation updating (as discussed in Experiment 1).
Further, it was also the first study to provide evidence
indicating that sense of agency played a critical role in
this phenomenon. Previous studies have reported that high-
level cognitive processes, including the comparison of goals
and goal attainment, greatly influence sense of agency (Metcalfe
and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2013; van der Weiden et al.,
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FIGURE 5 | Mean ratings for sense of ownership and agency in each condition in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors. Sense of ownership
ratings did not differ between the active and passive or no-goal and goal-directed conditions. Sense of agency ratings differed significantly between the active and
passive conditions but did not differ between the no-goal and goal-directed conditions.
2013; Wen et al., 2015b,c, 2016). Additionally, knowing the goal
of others’ actions induces illusionary sense of agency, even when
one’s own body remains static (Wegner et al., 2004). However,
no studies have been conducted to determine whether these
processes also influence body representation updating, while
sense of agency is closely connected with body representation
and probably contributes to the integration of distinct body parts
into a coherent whole (Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2007). However,
we do not suggest that sense of agency directly enhances
body representation updating, as there was no difference in
proprioceptive drift between the active and passive condition
when there was no goal (Experiment 2). The results of the present
study showed that high-level cognitive processes involved in
comparing goal-achievement intention with goal-attainment
feedback contributed to body representation updating, and sense
of agency was required in this process. In contrast, processes
in body representation updating based on the congruency of
multiple (low-level) sensory input probably do not require sense
of agency.
With respect to intentions during body movement, a
previous study categorized them into three types: distal
(intention to achieve an overarching goal), proximal (decision
to start acting now), and motor (intention to recall a motor
representation; Pacherie, 2008). The goal in the present study
involved distal intention and was activated only in the
condition involving the goal of touching the virtual object.
Apraxia patients provide evidence of a distinction between
distal and motor intention. Apraxia usually occurs because
of damage to the left frontoparietal cortex (Buxbaum et al.,
2003; Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014) and involves impairment
in performing planned/purposeful movement but not in the
motor representation itself (Leiguarda and Marsden, 2000).
Further, sense of agency is usually impaired in apraxia,
suggesting a functional link between sense of agency and
distal intention and a structural link between agency and
apraxia (de Jong, 2011; Pazzaglia and Galli, 2014). Moreover,
apraxia patients also experience difficulty in evoking and
representing conceptual knowledge regarding the human body
(Goldenberg, 1995; Buxbaum et al., 2000), suggesting a link
between distal intention (goal-directed action) and body
representation construction/updating. In the present study, when
participants had a goal, distal intention was activated and
probably contributed to the generation of body consciousness,
enhancing body representation updating. Conscious intention
is a key factor in sense of agency (Haggard, 2005), and distal
intentions were reported to increase the subjective sense of
agency (Vinding et al., 2013). We suggest that intention is also
a key factor in the observed effect of goal-directed movements
in body representation updating. More important, we found
that intention alone was not enough. Proprioceptive drift was
enhanced only when there was feedback on goal attainment
in addition to the goal, indicating that the reconstructive
processes involving effects of actions were also important in body
representation updating.
Further, in our experiments, we did not observe effects of
having a goal on subjective ratings of agency and ownership.
Agency and ownership ratings in the rubber hand paradigm
are usually taken as explicit indices of the illusion, while
proprioceptive drift is taken as an implicit index of body
ownership. However, we suggest that proprioceptive drift
reflects body representation, while agency and ownership
ratings reflect the extension of body consciousness, instead
of body representation itself. In other words, agency and
ownership ratings refer to subjective feelings about external
stimuli (e.g., the virtual hand) rather than one’s own body. The
discrimination between body ownership and proprioception was
also reported in previous behavior studies (Kammers et al., 2009;
Rohde et al., 2011) and supported by neuroscience research
(Blanke, 2012). Further, a prior study reported that people’s
ratings were higher for ownership in a passive-movement
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condition compared to an active-movement condition,
indicating that extension of body ownership mainly relies
on congruence between vision and tactile or proprioceptive
cues (Walsh et al., 2011). In contrast, we suggest that updating
of body representation may comprise multi-level processes,
including both sensory and high-level cognitive processes.
Additionally, in the present study, we used only two statements
in the subjective rating of the illusion, which was much
fewer than previous studies (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998;
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014). This might have weakened
the precision in measurement of ownership and agency.
Nevertheless, the relationship between different aspects of
body consciousness deserves further examination in future
research.
In conclusion, using the rubber hand paradigm of visuo-
motor adaption, we found that when people received goal-
attainment feedback, goal-directed movement enhanced
proprioceptive drift to a greater extent relative to that observed
in the condition without a specific goal. We also found that
the effect of having a goal occurred in active, but not passive,
movement, demonstrating the important role of sense of agency
in this phenomenon. The findings of the present study could
provide useful knowledge for practical applications involving
body representation. For example, immersive virtual reality
involving limb movements has been used to treat phantom
limb pain (Murray et al., 2007), as it temporally solved the
inconsistencies between body representation and disabled
limbs and facilitates body representation updating in the
brain. According to the results of the present study, adding
an overarching goal to limb movements or enhancing sense
of agency for such movements could improve treatment
effectiveness.
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